SALAMIS AND PLATAEA SETTLED THAT Persia should not expand into Europe. Her European conquests could no longer be held; in 479 she lost Sestos and the Hellespont, in 478 Byzantium and the Bosporus; with the fall of Eion soon afterwards Thrace and Macedonia recovered their independence, Doriscus and some forts in the Gallipoli peninsula remained, but were lost after the Eurymedon. During the rest of the century Persia’s foreign policy turns on two questions: are the Greek cities of the Aegean seaboard to be in her sphere or in that of Athens, and can she continue to hold Egypt? These two questions are treated elsewhere, and this chapter deals only with Persia’s internal history.
Xerxes’ return to Sardes after Salamis was not a flight, but was due to a fresh revolt of Babylon, where one Shamash-erba had assumed the crown, with the full royal title of King of Babylon and King of the Lands; from Sardes Xerxes could keep touch both with Babylon and Mardonius. Babylon’s final revolt was easily suppressed, and Xerxes now deprived the city of her exceptional position in the empire and made Babylonia an ordinary satrapy. He ordered the destruction of Marduk’s great temple, E-sagila, which Alexander found in ruins, and removed from it the statue of Marduk, thus rendering meaningless the accession ceremony of taking the hands of Bel; he razed Babylon’s remaining fortifications, abolished various native customs, and bestowed upon Persians the estates of many prominent Babylonians. The name of Babylon was dropped from the royal title, and henceforth Xerxes and his successors call themselves only ‘King of the Lands’; and Aramaic gradually replaces Babylonian as the language of official intercourse west of Babylonia. About the same time Xerxes’ brother Masistes, satrap of Bactria, also failed in an attempt to revolt; the empire was far too strong as yet for isolated local movements to succeed. Xerxes built himself a new palace at Persepolis, which was never completed; otherwise he seemingly spent the rest of his reign in idleness and sensuality at Susa, a period which supplies the background for the book of Esther, until, some time before April 464, in the 21st year of his reign, he was murdered by a courtier, Artabanus. He may not have been a personal coward, but he had few merits; he was vainglorious and weak, licentious and cruel, and even his pride was not of the kind which illumines misfortune. His murder represented a definite movement against his house, Artabanus also murdered his eldest son Darius, with the alleged help of his third son Artaxerxes, to whom he represented that Darius had murdered Xerxes. Artabanus must have had much support, for he reigned seven months, was recognized in Egypt, and defeated Xerxes’ second son Hystaspes. But Artaxerxes outwitted him; he bided his time, allowed Artabanus to remove those who stood between him and the throne, and then turned on the usurper and defeated and killed him.
Artaxerxes I, called Long-Hand whether from a physical peculiarity or political capacity is uncertain, dated his reign as from Xerxes’ death. It opened with the revolt of Inaros in Egypt. Though the revolt was ultimately suppressed, Artaxerxes nevertheless made concessions which left Inaros’ son Thannyras and one Psammetichus in possession of subordinate princedoms, and after Amyrtaeus’ death his son Pausiris was also permitted to retain his father’s principality. These concessions may be evidence of political wisdom on Artaxerxes’ part rather than of weakness, for the destruction of the Athenian expedition in aid of Inaros had been a notable victory; certainly when during his reign Herodotus visited Egypt he found it quiet and well-ordered. Artaxerxes also showed a tolerant wisdom in his dealings with the Jews. In the West however he suffered a definite setback, and at the so-called Peace of Callias in 449-8 Persia definitely abandoned the Aegean and the cities on its seaboard. In domestic affairs, he was not strong enough to resist his mother Amestris, Xerxes’ widow (who had already exhibited her cruelty during Xerxes’ life in her mutilation of a supposed rival), and though Inaros had submitted under definite covenants, Artaxerxes surrendered him to Amestris’ importunity and a horrible death; it was the beginning of the palace rule of women which for two generations was to weaken Persia. The immediate result was the revolt of Artaxerxes’ friend Megabyxus, the conqueror of Egypt, who had guaranteed to Inaros his life. The obscure story which has survived shows Megabyxus as alternately in revolt and in favour, as exiled and restored, his changes of fortune depending upon the intrigues of Amestris and Artaxerxes’ wife Amytis; the political reasons behind the story are lost. Artaxerxes died in spring 424, after reigning 40 years. What can be descried of his character is an energy in youth that afterwards died out, some political wisdom, and a vein of weakness. But he seems to have been a better ruler than his father or his son.
The usual struggle for the throne followed his death. His sole legitimate son succeeded him as Xerxes II, but was promptly murdered by his half-brother Sogdianus, who reigned some months and was then defeated by another half-brother, Ochus, and thrown into a slow furnace, a punishment which now becomes usual. The Babylonian chronology did not recognize Xerxes II and Sogdianus as kings, and seemingly added the duration of their reigns to that of Artaxerxes. Ochus took the crown very early in 423 as Darius II; Greeks nicknamed him Nothos “the bastard”. He did not lack courage, but was otherwise a worthless character, dominated by his half-sister and wife Parysatis, a monster of cruelty. Her government provoked a series of blind revolts. First the King’s brother Arsites rose and was overthrown and put to death; in this war, if tradition be true, both sides for the first time used Greek mercenaries. Then Pissuthnes of Lydia rose, and was defeated by Hydarnes’ son Tissaphernes, a man who was to play a large part in Persian history; in 413 he received the Lydian satrapy as a reward, but did not reduce Pissuthnes’ son Amorges till 412. A brief outbreak in Media in 410 was followed by Terituchmes’ conspiracy. Darius’ eldest son Arsaces had married Tissaphernes’ sister Statira, and his daughter Amestris Tissaphernes’ s brother Terituchmes; and Terituchmes formed a wide-reaching plot to overthrow Darius. He was betrayed and killed, and Parysatis in her vengeance almost exterminated Hydarnes’ house; Arsaces’ prayers indeed saved Statira, but Parysatis poisoned her many years later. Tissaphernes she could not reach; but in 407, taking advantage of his failure to prevent the temporary revival of Athens’ power, she persuaded Darius to appoint her favourite younger son Cyrus satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, with the supreme command in Asia Minor. Tissaphernes thus lost Lydia and was restricted to Caria and the Ionian cities, and Parysatis’ actions naturally made him the irreconcilable enemy both of herself and Cyrus. The weakness of Darius’ rule did not affect the efficiency of his satraps, as Pharnabazus, Tissaphernes, and Cyrus all showed in their dealings with Greece; but it undoubtedly encouraged Egypt to revolt.
In 405 Darius contracted an illness which raised the question of the succession. Of his thirteen children by Parysatis many were dead; Arsaces, the eldest son, naturally expected the crown, but Parysatis hoped to secure it for Cyrus. The story, however, that Cyrus had a good claim according to the precedent set by Darius I in Xerxes’ case, because he had been born after his father became king and Arsaces before, cannot be true; otherwise Cyrus could not have been over sixteen when in 407 he was sent to the coast as commander-in-chief, and this seems impossible. Darius in his illness sent for his two sons, and Cyrus came with Tissaphernes, who pretended to be his friend; but on Darius’ death, some time before April 404, Arsaces secured the succession, and Tissaphernes at once denounced Cyrus to him as plotting his murder. Whether it was true cannot be said; Cyrus was imprisoned, but Parysatis saved his life and procured his return to his satrapy, where, enraged and humiliated, he prepared to enforce his pretensions in arms. Arsaces took the name of Artaxerxes II; he was nicknamed Mnemon, from his excellent memory.
Cyrus is the one sympathetic figure among the later Achaemenids, though it is difficult to disentangle the real man from Xenophon’s eulogies, not only in the Anabasis but also in the Cyropaedia (if it be true that Xenophon’s portrait of the elder Cyrus partly represents what he believed the younger Cyrus would have become). Cyrus obviously possessed ambition and courage, great energy, and the power of attracting men’s devotion; he was generous in giving, more generous in promising; and beyond any other Persian he seems to have understood Greeks and been understood by them. But his unprovoked murder of his cousins, and his barbarous mutilation of all offenders, attest his inherited cruelty; and his defects of judgment were serious. He failed throughout to understand that Tissaphernes was his real danger, and his knowledge that Greek hoplites could defeat Persian infantry blinded him to the fact that Persia’s strength did not lie in infantry; his expedition had failed before it started, for, with all Cappadocia at his disposal, he set out to conquer the empire with some 2600 horse.
His first aim was to collect a Greek force without alarming Artaxerxes. All the Ionian cities except Miletus had revolted to him from Tissaphernes, and the siege of Miletus gave him a pretext for enrolling mercenaries; he subsidized a Spartan exile, Clearchus, to raise troops and employ them in Thrace till required; and his Greek friends Aristippus of Larissa, Sophaenetus of Stymphalus, Socrates of Achaea, and Gorgias’ pupil Proxenus of Boeotia, also recruited men, who were engaged to attack either Tissaphernes or Pisidia. There was hardly as yet a regular class of mercenaries in Greece, and the men were largely adventurous spirits who hoped to make money, and included some rough characters. Xenophon, a young Athenian and pupil of Socrates, came simply as Proxenus’ friend, without military rank; he liked war, and his admiration for Sparta perhaps made continued residence in Athens uncomfortable, Sophaenetus wrote the first story of the expedition, and Xenophon probably wrote his own account, the Anabasis, largely because he thought Sophaenetus had overlooked his merits; he published it under the assumed name of Themistogenes. He must have kept a diary, but on the retreat it was sometimes scantily posted up, and though he gives each day’s distance in parasangs (said to be Persian for ‘mile-stones’), these are not accurate measurements; along the Royal Road from Sardes to Thapsacus the distances were known, but after Thapsacus his parasangs can only represent some rough system of time-measurement; even to Persians the parasang, like the modern farsang, varied in different districts with the nature of the ground. As, in addition, he wrote many years after the events he records, some mistakes are inevitable; but the real weakness in his vivid narrative is that there is only his own word for the part he himself played.
Early in 401 B.C. Cyrus collected most of his army at Sardes, and announced that he meant to chastise the Pisidians; but Tissaphernes guessed his real objective, and with 500 horse rode hard to Susa to warn the King. About March Cyrus started; at Colossae Menon of Larissa, another pupil of Gorgias, joined him, bringing Aristippus’ men, and Clearchus joined at Celaenae, completing his force, which included (besides Asiatics) 9600 Greek hoplites and 2300 Greek and Thracian peltasts and light-armed; they brought a long train of carts and many women, both free hetaerae and slave girls. Clearchus, who commanded, was a stern disciplinarian, not popular, but trusted in battle. As Cyrus approached Iconium, Syennesis IV of Cilicia, Persia’s vassal, found himself in a dilemma; he wanted to be on the winning side, but did not know which side it would be; so he sent his wife Epyaxa to Cyrus with a large sum of money, which enabled him to pay the Greeks, and reinsured himself by sending his eldest son to Artaxerxes. From Iconium Cyrus went by Tyana in Cappadocia toward the Cilician Gates, the impregnable pass over the Taurus through which a camel could not go without unloading till Ibrahim blasted the modern road. He had saved Syennesis’ face by sending Menon with Epyaxa into Cilicia by Laranda, which officially turned the Gates; Syennesis duly withdrew his men, and Cyrus passed through, but Menon lost 100 men plundering, and the Greeks in anger sacked Tarsus. They now suspected that their objective was Artaxerxes, and mutinied; but Clearchus handled them very well, and Cyrus promised extra pay and assured them that he was only marching against Abrocomas, satrap of Syria.
At Issus Cyrus was joined by his fleet, commanded by the Egyptian Tamos, father of his friend Glos, and also by a Spartan squadron; Sparta had not officially declared war on Artaxerxes, but she had encouraged Clearchus and was unofficially supporting Cyrus. The fleet brought him 700 hoplites under the Spartan Cheirisophus, while 400 Greeks deserted to him from Abrocomas. Cyrus had brought up the fleet in order to turn the ‘pillar of Jonah,’ the pass between Issus and Myriandrus, if Abrocomas held it, but Abrocomas, who was possibly playing a double game, was not there; the pass was open, as were the Syrian Gates beyond Myriandrus, and Cyrus reached the Euphrates at Thapsacus without incident. There he announced that he was marching against Artaxerxes, and overcame the hesitation of the Greeks by higher pay and still higher promises. Abrocomas had hurried to Thapsacus before him and after crossing had burnt all the boats, but the river was exceptionally low, and Cyrus’ men waded across; it was taken as a sign of divine favour that the Euphrates had done obeisance to the future king, a curious parallel to the sea’s obeisance to Alexander at Mount Climax. They now turned down the Euphrates and marched southward along the east bank; the country was chiefly desert, the later civilization along the river being largely a creation of the Seleucids, and the sportsman in Xenophon found much to interest him: the wild asses, which could only be taken by driving; the ostriches, which no one could get near; and the bustards, which could be ridden down, like wild turkeys on the Pampas. Early in September they reached Babylonia, and perceived that an army was retiring before them. They passed a great trench, with a narrow passage left between it and the Euphrates whether it was a canal or (as Xenophon thought) a fortification seems very doubtful and the next day came somewhat unexpectedly upon Artaxerxes’ army near the village of Cunaxa, some 45 miles north of Babylon; possibly the mound Kunish south of Felluja.
Artaxerxes had deferred battle as long as possible, for he was expecting his brother from Susa and Abrocomas from Phoenicia; but both came too late (Abrocomas having presumably taken the regular Tigris route), and he had to stand to cover Babylon without them. He had only three satraps with him, Tissaphernes, Arbaces of Media, and Gobryas of Babylon, and probably something over 30,000 men; the infantry were poorly armed, but he had at least 6000 horse, perhaps more, most of them probably Persians and Medes, It was an army collected in a hurry, and far from representative of Persia’s strength; and though it depended for victory entirely on its cavalry, the absence of the satraps of Eastern Iran, Armenia, and Syria ( Cappadocia being controlled by Cyrus) shows that none of the cavalry which was to form the powerful wings at Gaugamela was present. The scythed chariots, as the battle shows, were few and inefficient; Xenophon’s 200 is a stereotyped figure which recurs at Gaugamela, and an extant work which passed as Xenophon’s shows how the Persians had neglected this arm.
Xenophon says that Cyrus had 10,400 Greek hoplites and 2500 Greek and Thracian peltasts and light-armed, figures which presuppose that not a man had fallen out on the march from Celaenae; as the men “were numbered, Xenophon must have omitted some reinforcements. Cyrus also had about as many native infantry, but only some 2600 horse, 600 of whom were his bodyguard, heavily-armed swordsmen ; in all perhaps somewhere about 28,000 men. Xenophon’s statement that Cyrus had 100,000 Asiatic troops and Artaxerxes 900,000 is of interest, as it shows that to an educated Athenian a figure like 100,000 had no meaning. Both armies were drawn up in similar order, and the battle shows there was little difference in length between the two lines. Artaxerxes’ infantry were in line on either wing, and in the centre between them were Tissaphernes with a strong cavalry force and Artaxerxes with the 1000 horse of the guard; the other two satraps with their cavalry were on the flanks- The Greek hoplites under Clearchus, less a strong camp-guard, formed Cyrus’ right wing, the Asiatics under his friend Ariaeus his left; between them were Cyrus and his bodyguard; the peltasts and 1000 horse covered Clearchus’ right flank and rested on the Euphrates, the remaining 1000 horse covered Ariaeus’ left.
Xenophon’s account of the battle of Cunaxa is unsatisfactory; he saw little of it, and was misled both by a report he heard that Tissaphernes was on the left and by his own absurd figures, which brought Artaxerxes himself outside Cyrus’ left; and his story is inconsistent with the certain fact that Cunaxa left Tissaphernes the man of the hour and that to him Artaxerxes ascribed his victory. Fortunately traces remain of a more understanding account, probably that of Sophaenetus, which explain this. As Cyrus knew that a Persian king always took the centre, his dispositions were so obviously wrong that some later writer invented a story that he had ordered Clearchus to occupy the centre and Clearchus had refused. What Cyrus did do when he saw his mistake Xenophon heard the order given was to order Clearchus to incline to the left, to bring the Greeks opposite Artaxerxes; but Clearchus, who saw that the Greeks would in any case be threatened on their left flank by the strong Persian cavalry of the centre, refused to expose his right flank also by withdrawing it from the river. One cannot blame Cyrus had put him on the right, and Alexander’s diagonal advance at Gaugamela shows that Cyrus’ manoeuvre would have been impossible unless the flanks had been as well guarded as Alexander’s were. The battle opened with the Greeks charging and easily routing the infantry of Artaxerxes’ left, while the cavalry on the Persian left charged through the peltasts along the river. Neither attack produced any result; the Persians rode straight on instead of taking Clearchus in rear, and Clearchus threw away the one chance of the day by going straight on, though he was on Artaxerxes’ flank. As Ariaeus with Cyrus’ left was held, Clearchus’ advance opened a gap in the line, and Tissaphernes decided the battle by throwing his cavalry into the gap, followed by Artaxerxes and the guard, threatening alike Clearchus’ rear and Ariaeus’ inner flank; it was the manoeuvre which the Persians nearly brought off at Gaugamela and Antigonus I did bring off at Paraetacene. Cyrus, hopelessly deficient in cavalry, had nothing with which to meet them but his bodyguard; with these he charged, in a gallant attempt to retrieve as a soldier the battle he had lost as a general. He cut his way through to Artaxerxes and slightly wounded him, but was then overborne and killed; his left wing, outflanked and with nothing more to fight for, fled; and Artaxerxes’ crown was secure, while Clearchus was still uselessly pursuing the defeated infantry. The Greeks returned to find the battle over; the Persian horse, with no need to charge unbroken hoplites, watched them till dark, retreating when they advanced, and at nightfall the Greeks returned to their camp, while 340 Thracians deserted. Cyrus’ death was a good thing for Greece; for the weapon subsequently furnished to Persia by the King’s Peace might, in his energetic hands, have transformed Greek history.
A formal demand for the unconditional surrender of the Greeks was made next day and refused. The Persians took some days to decide how to deal with them. A century later they would naturally have entered Artaxerxes’ service; but seemingly he regarded them as Cyrus’ friends and hated them accordingly. They were so slow to grasp the real position that they offered Ariaeus the crown, which of course he declined; Cyrus’ friends were only thinking of how to make their peace with Artaxerxes. They could count on Parysatis’ help, and presumably Parysatis and Tissaphernes, who had the support of his sister the queen Statira, were struggling for the control of the weak King; the result was ultimately a compromise. Cilicia became a satrapy, but otherwise Cyrus’ Asiatic friends were pardoned; later on Ariaeus became satrap of Phrygia (now definitely severed from the Hellespontine satrapy), Mithridates of Cappadocia, and Gobryas Artaxerxes’ admiral. This was as far as Parysatis’ influence reached. The King could not deny his debt to Tissaphernes; he gave him Cyrus’ satrapies, the command in Asia Minor, and full power to deal with the Greeks. It was not Tissaphernes’ aim to destroy them; he had not nearly enough cavalry in any case, and the canals made it impossible to wear down the Greeks as the Parthians were later to wear down the Romans at Carrhae. His fear was that they might establish themselves permanently in some strong position among the canals and give much trouble, and his first object was to get them out of Babylonia by any means. The Greeks on their side knew that they could not cross the Mesopotamian desert again without supplies; they occupied some villages, but, fortunately for themselves, did not accept a treacherous proposal by Ariaeus to guide them home; and when after two days Artaxerxes offered them a truce, Clearchus, who had learnt that he could not fight successfully without cavalry, gladly accepted. Tissaphernes came and went, sympathizing with their desire to go home, till the struggle at court was decided; then he pledged himself to secure their safe return, and they swore to do no harm. He led them south-east into Babylonia, making for the bridge of boats over the Tigris at Sittace on the Babylon-Susa road; on their way they passed the Median wall near Babylon, the rampart some 17 miles long which Nebuchadrezzar had built from Opis (subsequently a village of Seleuceia) to Sippara to guard Babylon, at the point where the Tigris and Euphrates most nearly approach each other. After crossing the Tigris Tissaphernes turned north, and took them straight up the river past Opis, and so without incident to the greater Zab, its principal tributary. This section of Xenophon’s narrative is in disorder; he misplaces Opis he may have transferred the name to another town and never mentions the lesser Zab.
At the Zab the suspicion which had been growing between the two armies came to a head, and Clearchus sought to remove it by a conference with Tissaphernes; among other things he offered him the services of the Greeks to put down the revolt in Egypt. Tissaphernes disclaimed any idea of treachery, and invited Clearchus and his officers to dinner; Clearchus went with Proxenus, Menon, Socrates, Agias, and all company commanders; all were seized and sent to Artaxerxes and all were put to death except Menon, who according to report died later under torture.
Xenophon has much ill to say of Menon, and Ctesias, Artaxerxes’ Greek physician, makes him responsible for Clearchus’ death; but Plato had a different idea of Menon, and the accusations may only mean that, while Xenophon and Ctesias admired Clearchus, Menon notoriously did not. Tissaphernes’ treachery was possibly due to personal hatred of Clearchus, the friend of Cyrus and Parysatis, and to the belief that without leaders the Greeks would be helpless, and must either surrender or be destroyed by the Carduchi; but possibly he was merely obeying Artaxerxes’ orders.
The Greeks were at first stunned by Clearchus’ arrest; but they decided to go on and chose new generals, Xenophon, who says he played a leading part in the decision, receiving Proxenus’ command, while Cheirisophus as a Spartan took the lead, important steps being settled in general conference. To move more easily, they burnt their carts and tents, which must have meant that the women had to go on foot; if the march of the Ten Thousand was a feat, the march of the women was a marvel. The horses, however, they used as pack-animals; one man brought away 3000 gold darics, another some valuable carpets. They advanced in hollow square up the Tigris past the ruins of ‘Larisa’ (Calah) and ‘Mespila’ (Nineveh), Cheirisophus leading and Xenophon commanding the rearguard, while Tissaphernes followed, worrying them with cavalry and slingers to keep them moving; they improvised a few horse and slingers as a reply. Thus amid frequent skirmishes they reached Jezireh, where the modern road crosses the Tigris and the hills of Kurdistan come down to the river.
A Rhodian offered to take them across the river native fashion on skins stuffed with grass, but a strong body of cavalry on the farther bank rendered this impossible; they had not the catapults which enabled Alexander thus to cross the Jaxartes in face of cavalry. So they struck into the hills of Kurdistan, which Persia had never conquered; and Tissaphernes left them.
The aim of the Greeks was, roughly, to reach Paphlagonia, i.e. Sinope or one of her colonies, and they believed that to do this they must sooner or later cross the arrow-swift Tigris: and prisoners had told them that beyond Kurdistan lay Armenia, where they could cross the Tigris near its source and go anywhere they chose. They followed the regular route through Kurdistan, but began with a battle, for the route ran uphill through a pass which was held in force by the Carduchian archers. They caught two natives, and by killing one induced the other to speak; he showed them another though difficult path which turned the pass, and after a severe fight and considerable loss they got through.
They took seven days to traverse Kurdistan, fighting perpetually, and Xenophon had to neglect his diary; and when they reached the Centrites, the Armenian boundary, they found Artaxerxes’ son-in-law Orontes, satrap of Eastern Armenia (i.e. Darius’ eighteenth satrapy), holding the farther bank. Some foragers however found a ford higher up, and by skilful strategy the army got across, out-manoeuvring Orontes, whose men gave little trouble; but the Carduchi swarmed down on them as they were crossing, and afforded Xenophon the opportunity of a brilliant little rearguard action. They crossed the Bitlis river, which they thought was the Tigris, went by Bitlis to Mush, crossed the Teleboas (Muradsu) into Western Armenia (the thirteenth satrapy, Armenia proper), met its satrap Tiribazus, and made an agreement with him that neither side should harm the other.
Henceforth their route is uncertain; Xenophon does not say what they knew, or if they were aiming at a particular point or going blindly northward; probabilities alone can be indicated. From Mush they probably bore westward to the Gunek river; on their way they honoured their agreement by burning some houses, and when a deserter reported that Tiribazus, who had followed them, meant to ambush them, they sent out a force which surprised and plundered its almost empty camp. Their one thought now was to escape quickly from his neighbourhood lest he should occupy the passes ahead. It had begun to snow; but apparently they left the road and went north across the hills for three days with local guides till they struck the western Euphrates, which they crossed somewhere westward of Erzerum. They were now not far from Gymnias and the road to Trapezus, and had taken a good line; but whether this was due to luck or judgment is unfortunately unknown. But the snow was increasing every day; it prevented them striking into the hills north of the Euphrates, and they turned and went slowly eastward along the river for two days, with the bitter wind in their faces. On the third day the gale became a blizzard; the snow deepened rapidly, and they spent a terrible night in the open; they were suffering from hunger, frostbite, and snow blindness, and many men and animals died. Next day Chelrisophus pushed on with the main body, while Xenophon had a hard task to round up and bring in the sick and stragglers; but after great difficulties all were collected and safely housed in a group of prosperous underground villages on the Erzerum plateau, where they rested and feasted; the headman of Xenophon’s village told them that to the north lay the Chalybes and that he knew the road.
After a week’s rest they started with the headman as guide; but before leaving someone carried off his son, and Xenophon took 17 horses which he was rearing for Artaxerxes, exposing the man to the King’s vengeance. Naturally therefore he led them astray, and guided them, not north to the Chalybes, but east to the upper Araxes. On the third day Cheirisophus saw something was wrong, and struck the man who escaped; Xenophon and Cheirisophus quarrelled over this, and Xenophon’s slurred account of these unhappy days suggests that they were not a memory he cared to dwell on. They were now completely lost; but, finding that the Araxes was locally called Phasis, they thought it was the river of Colchis and that by following it they would reach the Black Sea. They followed it eastward for seven days before discovering their mistake; they retraced their steps for two days and then turned north towards the country of the independent Taochi, one of the fixed points of their route; they successfully turned the tribesmen who were guarding the ascent, and reached the plain of Kars. Here they found it hard to get food, for the Taochi had brought their cattle into the fortified villages; one village gave them a desperate fight, and when taken the women first slew their children and then themselves; even Xenophon seems to feel that all was not quite right. How far north they went is uncertain but ultimately they fought their way through the mountains of the warlike Chalybes and reached the Harpasus river; and eight days easy marching along the river brought them to the native town of Gymnias, to which they had been so close seven weeks before when the snow turned them. From Gymnias a road ran to Trapezus; but the guide they got diverged from the road in order to attack a hostile tribe. It was here, when crossing a mountain called Theches (unidentified), that Xenophon heard a great commotion in the van and galloped forward, thinking it was the enemy; but the men were cheering and pointing to the distant Euxine, and crying ‘Thalatta thalatta” (’The sea, the sea). A few days later they were at Trapezus.
From the Taochi to Trapezus they had come through tribes which had never been subject to Persia, and west of Trapezus the one-time Persian rule had vanished; the north of Asia Minor was an impossible country to hold from the southward, as Alexander’s successors found. Darius’ nineteenth satrapy, which had extended from the Macrones west of Trapezus to Paphlagonia, no longer existed; while beyond it Corylas, the native king of Paphlagonia, was Persia’s vassal in name only, and Bithynia was completely independent. The sea and the coastal trade were controlled by the Greek cities of Sinope and Heraclea, Sinope having a chain of tributary colonies Cotyora, Cerasus, Trapezus stretching eastward; the once independent Amisus apparently belonged to Corylas. None of these cities, not even Sinope, was a match for this great body of armed men which had suddenly issued from the mountains. Trapezus was friendly, but could not supply shipping to take them home by sea, as they hoped. She did her best; they camped on her territory and she sent out food; she gave Cheirisophus a ship, and he went off to Byzantium to the Spartan admiral Anaxibius in the hope of getting transports; and when the army, on Xenophon’s proposal, decided to collect ships for themselves by piracy, she lent them two warships. A Lacedaemonian, Dexippus, and an Athenian were put in command, Dexippus promptly deserted and took his ship to Byzantium; but the Athenian, more conscientious in wrong-doing, brought in all the merchantmen he could catch. Food however ran short, and Trapezus, fearing they would raid her subject villages, directed their arms against a hostile tribe, the Drilae, at whose hands they nearly met with disaster. Lack of supplies then compelled them to move on; they put the women and baggage on ship-board and themselves inarched to Cerasus; their numbers were now reduced to 8600, which implies a loss of nearly 4000 fighting men since leaving Cunaxa, a loss chiefly inflicted by lighter-armed tribes-men.
At Cerasus they began to get out of hand. Danger had held them together on the march to Trapezus; with that pressure removed, their voluntary discipline vanished, and each section claimed to act for itself. The native villages of Cerasus’ territory were friendly, and sent food; nevertheless one company attacked a village and was cut to pieces. The village sent ambassadors to the army, and Xenophon accepted the good offices of the magistrates of Cerasus; but the army murdered the ambassadors., nearly stoned a magistrate, and created such a panic that the towns-people fled to their ships or into the sea. How Xenophon got the army away is not recorded, but later he did persuade them to hold an enquiry, and three officers were fined; he may have felt a certain satisfaction in recording that Sophaenetus was one. From this time Xenophon becomes more and more the one force making for order among these turbulent men; as an Athenian he really was more civilized than the majority, though the ascendancy he acquired was due to his own character.
After leaving Cerasus they entered the land of the Mossynoeci, ‘tower-dwellers,’ who are described as most uncivilized: they tattooed themselves and talked to themselves out loud, and prized their children in proportion to their breadth. Their clans were ruled by kings who lived each at the top of a wooden tower seven stories high, whence he administered justice; he was never allowed to come out a well-known and widespread form of taboo. They had a supreme king in a tower which the Greeks called Metropolis, and had conquered some Iron-working Chalybes, who acted as their blacksmiths. The Greeks found a civil war going on; they allied themselves with the nearer clans, took the Metropolis for them, and burnt the unhappy god-king alive in his tower. Thence they went through the Tibareni to Cotyora; but Cotyora had heard of their doings at Cerasus and closed her gates, and some envoys from Sinope threatened, if Cotyora’s lands were touched, to call in Corylas and his Paphlagonians; Xenophon in reply suggested that the Greeks might help Corylas to take Sinope, whereon the envoys became less truculent and friendship was established. But Xenophon was so impressed by what he heard of the difficulty of crossing the rivers Iris and Halys that he thought it would be better if the army settled somewhere and founded a city, obviously with himself as founder, and a design was attributed to him of turning back and seizing Phasis; the troops nearly stoned him when they heard of it, but he talked them back into good humour. Meanwhile some of the leaders had discovered some wealthy merchants from Sinope and Heraclea, and by threats extorted a promise of sufficient transports and a large sum of money. With Corylas they made a treaty, and entertained his envoys with an exhibition of their different national dances, ending up with a slave-girl with a little shield who danced the Pyrrhic dance very prettily. The ships came, but not the money, and there was more trouble before they finally went on board and sailed to Sinope; there Cheirisophus rejoined with the news that Anaxibius would engage and pay them when they reached the Straits.
Their preoccupation now was to get booty to take home, and, as they thought they might do better under a single leader, they offered Xenophon the command, and on his prudent refusal elected Cheirisophus. They then sailed to Heraclea hardly as yet the powerful state of a century later and proposed, against Cheirisophus’ wishes, to hold the city to ransom; Heraclea manned her walls, Cheirisophus’ brief command ended, and the army broke up into three fractions. One tried to raid the Bithynians and was cut up and surrounded and only saved so Xenophon suggests by the Bithynians guessing that he was coming to the rescue. The three fractions reunited at Calpe on the Bithynian coast, where Cheirisophus died. Meanwhile Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had come to the support of the Bithynians, hoping by their aid to prevent the Greeks entering his satrapy, and when part of the Greeks next went out to plunder they unexpectedly met his cavalry, who slew 500 of them; there was great alarm in the camp at Calpe, and they stood to arms all night. But Xenophon understood that attack may be the best defence; he led out the army next day, and for perhaps the first time in Greek history employed reserves, stationing three companies behind the line with orders to reinforce threatened points; they were not true reserves, as they were not under the general’s hand, but nothing of the sort was seen again till Gaugamela. There was however no real battle; the light-armed Bithynians drove in Xenophon’s peltasts, but were not going to face the spear-line, and Pharnabazus confined himself to covering his allies’ retreat, while the Greeks made little attempt to pursue, for -says Xenophon- “the cavalry made them afraid”; few lives were lost, and Xenophon’s reserves never got a chance. The Greeks returned to Calpe, and again Xenophon seems to have thought of founding a city; but nothing came of it.
They now came in touch with the power of Sparta. They hoped that Cleander, the Spartanharmost (governor) of Byzantium, would come for them with a fleet; he came with only two triremes and Dexippus, the man who had deserted from Trapezus, and walked straight into a dispute about some captured cattle. There was the usual riot; the army tried to stone Dexippus, and Cleander himself had to run. He was furious at having shown fear, and threatened to have the army outlawed from every Greek city; and for the first time Xenophon was afraid, for he knew that Cleander had power to carry out his threat. He prevailed on the two men implicated to surrender themselves, and Cleander behaved very well; having satisfied his honour by securing the culprits, he forgave and released them, and promised the army a welcome at Byzantium. The army went on to Chrysopolis near Chalcedon; thence, at Pharnabazus’ request, Anaxibius brought them across to Byzantium, where Xenophon proposed to leave them and remain. Anaxibius told the men they would get their promised pay outside the city; they quitted it accordingly, whereon he shut the gates and left them outside without money or food. When they perceived the trick they burst a gate and forced their way in again; Anaxibius fled to his ships, and there was universal panic, for the men were thoroughly angry and Byzantium lay at their mercy. But Xenophon, who was still there, went to them, persuaded them to pile arms and listen to him, and then talked them round into leaving the city quietly without doing any damage; it was far the greatest thing he ever did.
They left Byzantium and camped near Perinthus, where many deserted, and the supersession of Cleander and Anaxibius led to Xenophon joining them once more; but Cleander’s successor was hostile, and even sold their sick whom Cleander had humanely housed in Byzantium; and Xenophon and the 6000 who remained, left destitute and without prospects in a Thracian midwinter, took service with Seuthes, a dispossessed Thracian prince living by brigandage. They spent the winter sacking villages for Seuthes from the Aegean to the Euxine, and he cheated them of their pay; but by spring (399) the position had altered again; Sparta had declared war on Tissaphernes and sent Thibron to Asia, and two of Thibron’s officers came to Thrace and engaged Xenophon’s force. He took them across to Lampsacus and led them to Pergamum, then held by his friend Gongylus, one of a group of Greek dynasts ruling petty principalities in Aeolis; and on Gongylus’ advice Xenophon, who was penniless, turned free- booter himself, attacked the stronghold of a wealthy Persian landowner, and after a preliminary repulse captured the man and all his property, securing booty enough to set him up for life.
Here the story of the Ten Thousand really ends, those who remained -under 6000- being merged in Thibron’s army; they had left Cunaxa over 12,000 strong, and (allowing liberally for desertions at Perinthus) must have had at least 5000 casualties before reaching Byzantium. Whether Xenophon stayed with them is uncertain, but apparently his own city had no use for his considerable military talent; he subsequently joined Agesilaus, served under him in Asia, and fought for Sparta against Athens’ friend Thebes at Coronea (394), for which Athens formally exiled him. Sparta, however, gave him an estate at Scillus in Elis, then under her control, where he lived for some twenty years, hunting on the mountains and writing many of the books which have made him famous; the Anabasis itself may be later, between 370 and 367. He lost his estate after Leuctra (371); but the political position then enabled Athens to recall Sparta’s friend, and to Athens he returned, though possibly he died at Corinth.
It is tempting to apply to him Juvenal’s most famous lines: he performed a march without precedent across savage mountains; his reward has been to become a textbook for schoolboys.
Cyrus’ expedition has often been regarded as a prelude to Alexander’s, a view which Arrian emphasized when he took Xenophon’s title, Anabasis, for his own book, and outdid the list of superlatives applied by Xenophon to Cyrus with his own more eloquent list in eulogy of Alexander. Cyrus to Xenophon was as much the king by natural right as Alexander to Aristotle: the forces of nature do homage to both. But the prelude must not be taken to mean too much. The march of the Ten Thousand, though a great feat of courage and endurance, was unfortunately useful to Isocrates’ propaganda against Persia; and Isocrates, to prove his contention that Persians were cowards (one figures Alexander smiling over the Panegyricus) drew a picture which has coloured much of literature since a picture of 6000 men, the scum of Greece, defeating the whole strength of Asia, till Artaxerxes in despair betook himself to treachery, preferring to face the gods rather than the Greeks, and even so failed, and the 6000 returned home in greater security than many a friendly embassy. It is barely even the conventional half-truth. Cyrus marched almost the whole time through friendly territory or desert; he was defeated by an army quite unrepresentative of Persia’s strength; only about half of the Greeks got back to Byzantium; and Xenophon, very honestly, records their fear of the cavalry of a single satrap.
As the Greeks on their retreat were never attacked in earnest by any Persian army, that retreat no more proved Persia helpless than the destruction of the great Athenian expedition to the Delta had proved her invincible. Cyrus made men feel that Persia had become accessible; but her real weakness, the fact that her land-system could not produce infantry capable effacing Greek hoplites, had long been known. From the military point of view, the position as between Greek infantry and Persian cavalry in Asia was, at best, indecisive; and the one lesson taught by Cyrus’ expedition was that no one need hope to conquer Persia without a cavalry force very different from any which Greece had yet envisaged. That was the lesson which Alexander was to apply.
The internal history of Persia from 401 to 335 B.C. is the story of a struggle between the central government and its outlying provinces. The position at the end of the struggle was, that Darius’ conquests east of the Hindu Kush and the provinces along the south coast of the Black Sea were permanently lost, though when and how the Indian districts secured independence is unknown; but Egypt, independent until 343, was re-conquered, the western seaboard, after many vicissitudes, was re-incorporated in the empire, and the separatist tendencies of the western satraps were for the time overcome. Though Darius’ empire was not fully restored, the tradition of Persia’s weakness only partially accords with the facts; and if she passed through a period of confusion, so did Greece. The quarrels in Greece and Agesilaus’ abortive expedition, which are described elsewhere, convinced the Achaemenid kings, unfortunately for themselves, that no real danger could threaten from the West; and throughout the period their preoccupation is with Egypt, which consistently supported every revolt against them. Meanwhile a great change was proceeding in Greece; perpetual wars, the large number of exiles, and the absence of any outlet by colonization for the surplus population, had enormously increased the class of Greeks ready to serve as mercenaries; these tended to form a world by themselves, and Persia came to depend too much upon them.