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<span><span>At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. </span><span>In </span><span>The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History</span><span> international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.</span><span><br></span></span>

<span>Part I: Introduction and Historical Context</span>
<span><span>1. Introduction: The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History </span></span>
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<span><span>Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marx</span></span>
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<span><span>2. Summitry in the Twentieth Century: An Overview</span></span>
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<span><span>David Reynolds</span></span>
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<span>Part II: Contextualizing the Vienna Summit</span>
<h2><span>United States, France, and Great Britain</span><span><span>3. “The First Test of [. . .] Détente Will Be the Berlin Negotiation”: Berlin, Disarmament, and the 1960 Paris Summit </span></span><br><span><span>Richard D. Williamson </span></span><br><span><span>4. “Vienna, a City that is Symbolic of the Possibility of Finding Equitable Solutions”: John F. Kennedy and His European Summitry in Early June 1961</span></span><br><span><span>Günter Bischof and Martin Kofler</span></span><br><span><span>5. Great Britain and the Vienna Summit of June 1961</span></span><br><span><span>Anne Deighton</span></span><br><span><span>6. Paris as Beneficiary of the Unsuccessful Vienna Summit</span></span><br><span><span>Georges-Henri Soutou</span></span><br></h2>
<h2><span>Soviet Union</span><span><span>7. Soviet–American Relations in the Early 1960s</span></span><br><span><span>Vladimir Pechatnov</span></span><br><span><span>8. Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The U.S. –Soviet Negotiating Process in the Khrushchev Era</span></span><br><span><span>Ol’ga Pavlenko</span></span><br></h2>
<h2><span>Asia and Africa</span><span><span>9. Casting a Long Shadow over Vienna: The Chinese Factor in the Vienna Summit</span></span><br><span><span>Michail Prozumenshchikov</span></span><br><span><span>10. Laos and the Vienna Summit</span></span><br><span><span>Lawrence Freedman</span></span><br><span>Part III: The Summit</span><span><span>11. Two Days of Drama: Preparation and Execution of the Vienna Summit</span></span><br><span><span>Barbara Stelzl-Marx</span></span><br><span><span>12. A Difficult Education: John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev in Vienna</span></span><br><span><span>Timothy Naftali</span></span><br><span><span>13. “Summit Ladies”: Gender Arrangements, Media Staging, and Symbolic Scenes of the 1961Vienna Summit Talks </span></span><br><span><span>Ingrid Bauer</span></span><br><span><span>14. Moral Masculinity: Gender, Power, and the Kennedy–Khrushchev Relationship</span></span><br><span><span>Jennifer Lynn Walton</span></span><br><span><span>15. On the Significance of Austrian Neutrality for Soviet Foreign Policy under Nikita S. Khrushchev </span></span><br><span><span>Peter Ruggenthaler</span></span><br><span><span>16. The Personal Recollections of a Presidential Adviser in Vienna</span></span><br><span><span>Ted Sorensen</span></span><br><span><span>17. The Personal Recollections of Khrushchev’s Interpreter in Vienna</span></span><br><span><span>Viktor Sukhodrev</span></span><br><span>Part IV: The Berlin Crisis</span><span><span>18. Khrushchev, the Berlin Wall, and the Demand for a Peace Treaty, 1961–1963</span></span><br><span><span>Gerhard Wettig </span></span><br><span><span>19. The Vienna Summit and the Construction of the Berlin Wall</span></span><br><span><span>Manfred Wilke</span></span><br><span>Appendices</span><span><span>Appendix 1: Soviet Kennedy Profile</span></span><br><span><span>Appendix 2: CIA Profile of Krushchev in Kennedy’s Briefing Papers</span></span><br><span><span>Appendix 4:Krushchev’s Presidium Statement before the Vienna Trip</span></span><br><span><span>Appendix 3-1:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 3 June 1961, 12:45 p.m.</span></span><br><span><span>Appendix 3-2:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 3 June 1961, 3 p.m.</span></span><br><span><span>Appendix 3-3:Memorandum of Conversation, Vienna, 4 June 1961, 10:15 a.m.</span></span><br></h2>
<h2><span>Bibliography</span></h2>
<h2><span>About the Contributors</span><span></span></h2>

<span><span>Günter Bischof</span><span> is a university research professor and director of CenterAustria at the University of New Orleans, Louisiana.</span></span>
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<span><span>Stefan Karner</span><span> is </span><a></a><span>head of the Department of Economic, Social, and Business History at the University of Graz and director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research of War Consequences, Graz-Vienna.</span></span>
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<span><span>Barbara Stelzl-Marx</span><span> is deputy director of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research of War Consequences and lecturer at the University of Graz.</span></span>
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